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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY - wARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS - Ex.TENSION TO INJURY
CAUSED BY APPLIANCE NOT IN CoNTRoL OF SlilPOWNER-Libellant, a longshore foreman for a stevedoring company loading petitioner's ship, was injured
when a snatch block broke, causing some loading gear to fall upon his leg.
Conflicting evidence in the lower court was resolved by the trial judge, who
found that the snatch block was supplied by the stevedoring company. On the
basis of this £.nding, the trial court held that neither the ship nor its appliances
were unseaworthy, and that libellant could not recover against the shipowner.
The court of appeals reversed1 and remanded the cause for determination of
damages. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed per curiam without
opinion. Alaska Steamship Company v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396, 74 S.Ct. 601
(1954). The Court considered the case governed by Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki2 and Pope and Talbot v. Hawn. 3 Three justices dissented.
The warranty of seaworthiness is an American exotic in the general maritime law.4 The English courts gave no right of action on grounds of unseaworthiness in the absence of statute. 5 Although defects in ship or appliances
were early recognized as grounds for desertion or for compelling a survey,6 a
right of action on such grounds was £.rst recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in a questionable dictum in 1903.7 The absolute nature of the

Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson, (9th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 478.
328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872 (1946).
346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202 (1953).
None of the ancient sea codes gave such a right of action. See Laws of Oleron,
Wisbuy, and Banse Towns, reprinted at 30 Fed. Cas. 1171.
5 ''There· being no allegation of scienter, if we held the defendant liable on this
count, we must hold a shipowner liable to an action from every seaman, if, from any
accident, a butt having started or the like, the ship was not seaworthy. No such action
has ever been brought: this is a case of first impression, in support of which neither a
decision nor even a dictum has been brought to our notice; nor has any legal principle been
urged in its support." Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & BL 402 at 407, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
But see MoLLOY, DE JuRE MAmTIMo ET NAvALI, 4th ed., 220 (1690): "If it happens
that the Master commands his Boat to be manned out, and it so happens that the same is
out of order, or unfit to take the Sea, the Tews, or other accoutrements being impotent, if
the Mariners happen to be drowned, the Master is to repay by the Law Marine one whole
years hire to the Heirs of the drowned: Therefore Masters ought carefully to view and see
that the Boat be fit for men to trust their lives upon his command." See also JusnCE, Qp
THE LAws OP THE SEA, ANcmNT AND MoDERN, 3d ed., 456 (1710).
Although the right of action was thought to have been secured by statute, 39 & 40
Viet., c. 80, §5 (1876), its provisions have been given a restrictive interpretation by the
House of Lords. Hedley v. Pinkney & Sons Steamship Co., [1894] 19 A.C. 222.
6 Dixon v. The Cyrus, (D.C. Pa. 1879) 7 Fed. Cas. 755. Cf. Ctmns, THE RIGHTS
AND DUTIES OP MERCHANT SE.AMEN 19, 20 (1841).
7The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483 (1903). The American decisions cited by
Justice Brown, with one possible exception, turned on negligence. The City of Alexandria,
(D.C. N.Y. 1883) 17 F. 390 (no recovery because no negligence); The Edith Godden,
(D.C. N.Y. 1885) 23 F. 43 (high duty of care; analogized to recovery at common law);
The Frank and Willie, (D.C. N.Y. 1891) 45 F. 494 (negligence of mate was ground for
recovery against owners); The Julia Fowler, (D.C. N.Y. 1892) 49 F. 277 ("deliberate use
of rigging or methods plainly unsafe"); Olson v. Flavel, (D.C. Ore. 1888) 34 F. 477
1
2
3
4
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liability was not a certainty for several years after that decision, 8 but was confirmed in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,9 and was extended to cover stevedores10 and other harbor workers11 in subsequent decisions. Although the longshoreman is covered by a federal compensation statute which provides the only
remedy against his employer,12 recovery is not precluded on the warranty of
seaworthiness against third parties.13 The principal case apparently vitiates a
doctrine of the Second and Third Circuits whereby the ship's owner was not
liable for injury occurring while control of the particular area was relinquished
to an independent contractor.14 While this "relinquishment of control" doctrine
might properly be criticized where the instrumentality causing injury belongs
to the vessel, the decision in the principal case goes beyond the mere elimination
of that criticism by expanding the definition of unseaworthiness. - The two cases
cited by the majority as demanding affirmance do not tum on the definition of
seaworthiness, but rather upon the classes of persons within the scope of the
warranty. 15 Since the position of libellant was the same essentially as in the
Sieracki case, the real issue was whether a vessel is made unseaworthy by the
acts of an independent contractor in bringing aboard a defective appliance. By
an affirmative determination of that issue, the Court has made the owner a
virtual insurer of injuries to maritime workers which occur on board his vessel.
The common law analogies of liability without fault, it should be noted, are
limited to situations where the defendant has some control over the instrumentality causing injury. 16 The shipowner, on the other hand, is now responsible
directly for the event of the injury rather than for its cause. If seaworthiness is
henceforth to be so loosely defined, it might more properly be done by the
(negligence of master); The A. Heaton, (C.C. Mass. 1890) 43 F. 592 (negligence of
master). The exception is The Noddleburn, (D.C. Ore. 1886) 28 F. 855 (knowledge of
the unseaworthy condition) but the language of the court is contrary to that in Couch v.
Steel, note 5 supra). It is plausible to argue that the Court propounded the warranty of
seaworthiness as an escape valve to the harsh operation of the fellow-servant rule, also
imported into the admiralty in The Osceola.
s See Fitz-Henry Smith, ''Liability for Injuries to Seamen,'' 19 HAnv. L. REv. 418 at
425 (1906).
o 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455 (1944).
10 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, note 2 supra.
11 Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, note 3 supra; 2 NoRRis, LAW OP SEAMEN §622, p. 259
(1952); Robinson, "Seamen in American Admiralty Law," 16 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 284
(1936).
12Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. L. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. (1952) §901 et seq.
13 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, note 2 supra. But see dissent in the same case.
14Lauro v. United States, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 32 (dictum); Lynch v. United
States, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 97; Grasso v. Lorentzen, (2d Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d)
127; Lopez v. Hawaiian-American Steamship Co., (3d Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 418;
Mollica v. Compania Sud-Americana De Vapores, (2d Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 25, cert.
den. 345 U.S. 965, 73 S.Ct. 952 (1953) (dictum).
15 In neither the Sieracki case nor the Pope and Talbot case was there any question as
to whether the defective appliance belonged to the vessel.
16 See PROSSER, SELECTED ToP1cs ON THE LAw OP TonTS 135, 186-189 (1953);
Holmes, "The Theory of Torts," 7 AM. L. REv. 652 (1873).
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legislative branch of the government, since the economic and social effect ultimately is to increase shipping costs and thus -costs to consumers.17 In addition
to its eff~t on the "relinquishment of control" doctrine, the decision may well
resolve the qu~stion whether demise of a vessel on bareboat charter limits maritime workers to action against the owner pro hac vice on the warranty.18 It is
hoped, however, that the principal case will be limited to its facts, as suggested
in the dissenting opinion.19
George S. Flint, S.Ed.

17 The serious effect of constant expansion of the right of recovery can best be realized
through reading the statistics relating to incidence of maritime injuries during a given
year. See, e.g., 2 Non;Ris, LAw oF SEAMEN 240 (1952).
18 Recovery was allowed against the charterer in Cannella v. Lykes Bros. Steamship
Co., (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 794, principally on the basis of avoiding circuity of action.
Contra: Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., (1st Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 286; Muscelli v.
Frederick Starr Contracting Co., 296 N.Y. 330, 73 N.E. (2d) 536 (1947).
19 Principal case at 402.

